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CRIMINOLOGY
THE PERCEPTIONS OF JUVENILE JUDGES
REGARDING ADOLESCENT
DEVELOPMENT IN EVALUATING
JUVENILE COMPETENCY
COLLEEN M. BERRYESSA & JILLIAN REEVES*
This analysis provides the first known in-depth qualitative inquiry into
if and how juvenile court judges take the psycho-social immaturity and
development of adolescents into consideration when making attributions of
adjudicative competency of offenders in juvenile court. Semi-structured
interviews were conducted with twenty-seven U.S. juvenile court judges,
followed by grounded theory analysis. Competency evaluations from
psychologists and the juvenile’s age, history, awareness, and mental capacity
influence judicial determinations of competency. Although data show that
understandings of adolescent development do play a large role in shaping
judges’ understandings of juvenile behavior—particularly related to
emotional control, irrational behavior, lack of maturity, and social
susceptibility—most judges only connected these characteristics to juvenile
offending. Although cognizant that juveniles exhibit attributes that diminish
competency-related abilities as part of their adolescent development, the
majority of judges still stated that adolescent development is not important
to them in assessing juvenile competency, potentially demonstrating a
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cognitive disconnect on these issues. These results indicate approaches to
how judges might think about juvenile competency decisions (“building
blocks” vs. “holistic” models) and the need for more direct education and
training of judges on the role of adolescent development in competency.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been vocal concerns about whether juvenile
competency to stand trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings can be
effectively measured by the Dusky two-prong test.1 According to this test, a
juvenile must first understand the charges and legal proceedings that are
mounted against him, and, second, he must also be able to assist his lawyer
in his own defense.2 Regardless of jurisdiction, a judge evaluating a
juvenile’s competency may examine the juvenile’s maturity.3 This may
include an assessment of the juvenile’s ability to understand the long-term
consequences of his actions and decisions in court, and his susceptibility to
being excessively influenced by others, including his lawyer.4 Each of these
competency-related abilities is dependent on the juvenile’s psycho-social
maturity and developmental status and, particularly, changes in the juvenile’s
cognitive abilities resulting from neurological changes in adolescence and
early adulthood.5
An appreciation of the extent to which a juvenile offender possesses
competency-related abilities, especially by the juvenile judge ultimately
making the competency determination, is necessary to ensure that the
juvenile offender’s case can be adjudicated without coercion in a
“developmentally appropriate way.”6 Therefore, understanding the ways in
which juvenile judges consider research on adolescent development that is
likely relevant to juvenile competency determinations is integral to ensuring
fair and equitable outcomes for juvenile offenders.
Further, this
understanding may assist states that are considering developing or modifying
1

Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Juveniles’ Competency to Stand Trial: Wading Through the
Rhetoric and the Evidence, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135, 138 (2008).
2
Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern Juvenile
Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 353, 357 (2001).
3
See Jennifer Mayer Cox et al., The Impact of Juveniles’ Ages and Levels of Psychosocial
Maturity on Judges’ Opinions About Adjudicative Competence, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 21,
22 (2012).
4
See generally Nancy L. Ryba et al., Juvenile Competence to Stand Trial Evaluations: A
Survey of Current Practices and Test Usage Among Psychologists, 34 PROF. PSYCHOL. 499
(2003) (presenting and analyzing elements assessed by psychologists in juvenile competency
evaluations).
5
Id. at 500.
6
April R. Bradley et al., Juvenile Competency and Responsibility: Public Perceptions, 42
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2411, 2412 (2012).
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juvenile competency statutes, as well as help in the design of more tailored
and effective educational programs for judges on these issues.7
This Article, which is exploratory as the first of its kind in in-depth
qualitative analysis, considers the attitudes of juvenile judges regarding
competency to stand trial in relation to their understandings and perceptions
of adolescent development and psycho-social maturity. Presenting a
qualitative analysis of twenty-seven interviews with a national sample of
juvenile judges, we reveal the factors that judges find influential in
determining juvenile competency,8 judges’ understandings of existing
research on adolescent development,9 and judges’ views on the influence of
age on competency and developmental-maturity-related abilities.10 We find
that although data show that research on and understandings of adolescent
development do play a large role in shaping judges’ understanding of juvenile
behavior,11 the majority of judges only connected these characteristics to
offending and did not suggest that adolescent development is important to
them in assessing juvenile competency.12 Thus, the data presented indicate
that many judges consider juvenile competency as largely unrelated to
adolescent development and do not see a connection between the two.13 This
research does have limitations, as it only portrays the views of twenty-seven
self-selected individuals, sampling was not nationally representative, and it
is unknown how the views presented here may actually impact juvenile
competency determinations in practice. As such, future studies, particularly
those that use research designs with experimental components that may
provide methodological triangulation on these issues, are warranted.
Nonetheless, we argue that the fact that many judges in our study do not
consider adolescent development as relevant to competency determinations,
yet still indicate that juveniles exhibit attributes due to adolescent
development that diminish competency-related abilities, shows a cognitive
disconnect in judges’ perceptions on how adolescent development may affect
competency.14 In response, in order to adjudicate juvenile cases in a
7
For discussions of how judge research can help juvenile justice policy, see generally
GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (3rd ed. 2007); Colleen M. Berryessa,
Potential Impact of Research on Adolescent Development on Juvenile Judge Decision‐
making, 69 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 19 (2018).
8
See infra Section V.A.
9
See infra Section V.B.
10
See infra Section V.C & V.D.
11
See infra Section V.B.
12
See infra Section V.C.
13
See infra Section V.C.
14
See infra Section VI.
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“developmentally appropriate way,” these results indicate the need for
further research and more direct education and training of judges on the role
of adolescent development in not only offending, but also in competency.15
This analysis provides the first in-depth empirical qualitative inquiry on how
juvenile judges perceive research on adolescent development and how it
might affect the competency evaluation process.
I. JUVENILE LEGAL COMPETENCY
Competency to stand trial is a legal protection put forth to ensure that a
defendant receives a fair trial.16 Standards of competency for criminal
defendants were formalized in the landmark case Dusky v. United States,
which established that competency to stand trial in criminal court involves
two elements: (1) defendants must be able to assist their attorneys in
mounting their defenses, and (2) defendants must fully understand court
proceedings and the charges against them.17 This is contrasted with legal
capacity, which is a person’s ability to make particular legal decisions such
as entering a guilty plea or entering into a contract, and legal culpability,
which is a person’s blameworthiness for a criminal act and to what degree he
should be held responsible.18
In criminal court, adult defendants are typically declared incompetent
due to severe mental illness or an intellectual disability.19 In the juvenile
court setting, competency to stand trial played no role until 1967.20 The legal
rights of juveniles were not originally viewed as relevant within the juvenile
court system given its rehabilitative purpose.21 The juvenile court system
was a product of the Progressive Movement beginning in the late nineteenth
century, which pushed for the creation of an independent legal system for

15

Bradley et al., supra note 6, at 2428.
See Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 459, 473 (2009).
17
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); see also Dana Royce Baerger et al.,
Competency to Stand Trial in Preadjudicated and Petitioned Juvenile Defendants, 31 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 314, 314 (2003); Christina L. Riggs Romaine et al., Evaluation of
Juvenile Competency to Proceed: Applying the Dusky Standard, 10 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL.
PRAC. 1, 2 (2010); Ryba & Cooper, supra note 4, at 499.
18
See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 472–73.
19
See Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 334
(2003).
20
See David R. Katner, Eliminating the Competency Presumption in Juvenile
Delinquency Cases, CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 410, 413–14 (2015).
21
Steinberg, supra note 16, at 474.
16
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youth that was neither criminal nor adversarial in nature.22 The first juvenile
court was established in 1899 in Cook County, Illinois, and by 1928, all but
two states had a juvenile justice system.23 The initial purpose of the system
was to rehabilitate juvenile offenders and protect children from
maltreatment.24 Particularly, the creation of an independent system for
juvenile offenders was built upon the principle that age and immaturity
rendered juveniles less culpable compared to adults and, hence, capable of
becoming good members of the community if offered suitable
rehabilitation.25 Thus, treatment and protection of the child were considered
the best responses to delinquent behavior, as opposed to traditional
punishment.26
The latter half of the twentieth century saw a gradual increase in legal
protections for juveniles generally and their rights found within the adult
court setting. Initially, Dusky only applied to defendants tried in criminal
court and did not extend to juvenile defendants in juvenile court.27 However,
In re Gault established juvenile rights to a fair trial and due process, including
a right to an attorney, the right to be protected against self-incrimination, the
right to an appeal, and most importantly in this context, the fundamental right
to competency to stand trial in juvenile court.28 The constitutional right of
competency to stand trial and the potential extension of the Dusky standard
suddenly became relevant to juveniles and a meaningful aspect of the
juvenile justice adjudication process.29
As competency to stand trial has become a significant component of
juvenile justice, issues have been raised as to how the Dusky standards of
competency should be practically applied to juveniles. While competency
requires that juveniles be able to understand the nature of their charges and
22

Id. at 461–62.
RANDALL G. SHELDEN, DELINQUENCY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 443
(2d ed. 2012).
24
For discussions of the founding of the juvenile justice system, see generally Laura S.
Abrams, Juvenile Justice at a Crossroads: Science, Evidence, and Twenty-First Century
Reform, 87 SOC. SERV. REV. 725 (2013); Redding & Frost, supra note 2.
25
Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 141–44 (1997).
26
See Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications
for Law and Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 769, 772–73 (2015); Steinberg, supra note 16, at 461–
62.
27
Grisso et al., supra note 19, at 333–34.
28
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34–42 (1967).
29
See Frank Fortunati et al., Juveniles and Competency to Stand Trial, 3 PSYCHIATRY 35,
35–36 (2006); Ryba & Cooper, supra note 4, at 500; Scott & Grisso, supra note 25, at 141–
48; Twila A. Wingrove, Note, Is Immaturity a Legitimate Source of Incompetence to Avoid
Standing Trial in Juvenile Court?, 86 NEB. L. REV. 488, 494–98 (2007).
23
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assist in mounting a defense, states have been largely silent regarding
whether Dusky standards should apply equally to defendants in juvenile
court.30 Although several states have formally implemented statutes
regarding competency to stand trial in juvenile court, around twenty states
continue to process defendants in juvenile court without a well-defined
statutory competency standard.31 Among the states that have adopted
juvenile competency statutes, thirteen have adopted the Dusky standard
almost verbatim, while eighteen states have adopted a version of the Dusky
standard.32
The addition of the Dusky standard to juvenile law has left many
questions unanswered, particularly whether developmental immaturity
should be integrated into competency standards.33 While both adults and
juveniles can be mentally ill or disabled, one unique and pertinent feature of
the juvenile population is that their adolescent development, as well as their
psycho-social immaturity, has the potential to influence competency.34 A
few states, such as Arkansas and Florida, have juvenile competency statute
provisions related to developmental immaturity.35 However, despite these
statutory provisions, juvenile judges have no real guidelines on how to
consider the impact of developmental factors, such as age and maturity, on
adolescent development in competency determinations, either apart from or
alongside the Dusky standard.36 It is also unclear whether judges in these
states actually consider adolescent development.37 Judges in other
jurisdictions either are not tasked with weighing adolescent development in
juvenile competency evaluations or may take such information into account
at their own discretion.38

30

See Sanborn, supra note 1, at 139.
Id. at 140.
32
Id.
33
See Abrams, supra note 24, at 737; Eraka Bath & Joan Gerring, National Trends in
Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial, 53 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 265,
265–67 (2014).
34
See generally Scott & Grisso, supra note 25 (discussing psycho-social deficits related
to juvenile capacity and competency).
35
See Kellie M. Johnson, Juvenile Competency Statutes: A Model for State Legislation,
81 IND. L.J. 1067, 1085–86 (2006).
36
See Sanborn, supra note 1, at 138–49.
37
See id.
38
See id. at 140–43.
31
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II. ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
COMPETENCY
Research in the fields of neuroscience and psychology on the
development of the human brain has produced new insights on and
explanations of adolescent behavior in the last twenty years. For adolescents,
certain brain regions mature much later than others; for example, the limbic
system, implicated in emotional responses to stimuli, matures quickly during
the teen years.39 However, the frontal areas, which are responsible for skills
associated with executive function, such as controlling inhibition, judgment,
decision-making, and planning, do not finish development until an individual
is around twenty-five years old.40
This time difference in structural and functional maturation between the
limbic system and frontal areas results in an “immaturity gap” between adults
and juveniles.41 Although juveniles show similar reasoning ability and
general intelligence levels as adults by the mid-teens, their decision-making
abilities are significantly worse: compared to adults, juveniles have
heightened responses to emotional stimuli and increased impulsivity.42
Juveniles tend to take more risks than adults, in large part due to the
heightened value placed on reward and high susceptibility to peer and
authority influence.43 Planning abilities of juveniles tend to improve with
age, suggesting that rash, impulsive behavior commonly seen in juveniles is
the result of the developmental mismatch between the limbic system and
frontal lobe.44
39

See Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Suparna Choudhury, Development of the Adolescent
Brain: Implications for Executive Function and Social Cognition, 47 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHIATRY 296, 301–07 (2006). For other reviews of studies addressing youth maturation of
the limbic system, see generally Sarah-Jayne Blakemore et al., The Role of Puberty in the
Developing Adolescent Brain, 31 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 926 (2010); Sarah B. Johnson et al.,
Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in
Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216 (2009).
40
See Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 39, at 301–02. For other reviews of studies
demonstrating the lack of youth maturation of the frontal lobes before age twenty-five, see
generally Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice, 42 AKRON L. REV. 917 (2009);
Cohen et al., supra note 26; Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and
the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321 (2006); Johnson et al., supra
note 39; Steinberg, supra note 16.
41
See Aronson, supra note 40, at 922.
42
See Blakemore et al., supra note 39, at 927–31. For reviews of studies showing youth
impulsivity and emotionality, see generally Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 39; Cohen
et al., supra note 26.
43
See Lucy Foulkes & Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Is There Heightened Sensitivity to Social
Reward in Adolescence?, 40 CURRENT OP. IN NEUROBIOLOGY 81 (2016).
44
See Abrams, supra note 24, at 737–44; Steinberg, supra note 16, at 466.
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In the last twenty years, there has been at least a partial return to the
rehabilitative goal of juvenile court, due in large part to an increase in
acceptance of research on adolescent development.45 Criminality in youth is
thought to be a reflection of impulsivity, poor decision-making, and inability
to think about long-term consequences.46 Juveniles make riskier decisions
and think less about consequences, which may lead to offending.47 Inhibition
control, short-term memory, and processing speed are also stunted during
adolescence, which can lead to anti-social behavior fueled by reward and
peer influence.48 Therefore, recent research empirically confirms the
principles upon which the juvenile justice system was originally built: that
age and inexperience make juveniles different from adults and accordingly
less culpable.49 The use of research on adolescent development in major
Supreme Court cases such as Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and
Miller v. Alabama has signaled a legal shift toward acknowledging the
differences between juveniles and adults in psycho-social maturity, and these
cases have removed the most retributive punishments: the death penalty and
life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.50
Yet, the same behaviors and tendencies associated with the “immaturity
gap”51 that have signaled a legal change in understanding juvenile culpability
and punishment have implications for juvenile competency as well.52
Particularly, maturity of judgment in legal contexts is significantly affected
by adolescent development.53 Although there might not be substantial
differences between the cognitive abilities of “average” adolescents and
adults, those cognitive abilities do not specifically help youth with
45

See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 479.
Alison S. Burke, Under Construction: Brain Formation, Culpability, and the Criminal
Justice System, 34 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 381, 382–83 (2011).
47
See Claire Bryan-Hancock & Sharon Casey, Young People and the Justice System:
Consideration of Maturity in Criminal Responsibility, 18 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 69, 73
(2011). For reviews of studies showing youth risk-taking, see generally Margo Gardner &
Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision
Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 625 (2005).
48
See Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 39, at 297–307; Johnson et al., supra note 39,
at 218.
49
See Scott & Grisso, supra note 25, at 172–76.
50
See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see also Cohen et al., supra note 26, at 773–
75.
51
Aronson, supra note 40, at 922.
52
See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 473–76.
53
See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence:
Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1996).
46
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competency-related behaviors for trial.54 For example, a juvenile’s ability to
understand the long-term consequences of his actions and decisions in court;
his ability to avoid being unduly influenced by others including his lawyer
and the judge; the maturity of his decision-making related to waiving legal
rights or taking pleas; and his ability to understand legal jargon, the legal
process, the charges against him, and the weight of legal decisions are all
potentially impaired by the adolescent immaturity gap.55 Each of these
competency-related capacities depends on the juvenile’s current
developmental status and cognitive abilities, which in turn are directly
influenced by the psychological and brain changes that take place in
adolescence and early adulthood.56 These capacities, as well as knowledge
of trials and legal concepts, appear to be lacking for a huge number of
adolescents across age groups and particularly for children under sixteen.57
A few studies have used “competency screening” measures to assess the
abilities of juveniles, but these often fail to consider maturity and psychosocial abilities.58 The use of the MacArthur Competence Assessment ToolCriminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA) as a proxy for competency has shown
mixed results when used in juvenile populations.59 The MacCAT-CA has
three subcategories thought to measure cognitive aspects of competency:
Understanding (the ability to understand the law); Reasoning (the ability to
reason in legal proceedings and with respect to legal decisions); and

54

See id. at 334–36.
See id. at 335.
56
See Ryba et al., supra note 4, at 500.
57
See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741,
742–45 (2000). For discussions on the lack of legal capacities of youth, see generally Michele
Peterson-Badali et al., Young Children’s Legal Knowledge and Reasoning Ability, 39 CAN. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 145 (1997); Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 53.
58
See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical
Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (1992) [hereinafter Bonnie, A Theoretical
Reformulation]; Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky
and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1993) [hereinafter Bonnie, Beyond Dusky and Drope];
Deborah K. Cooper, Juveniles’ Understanding of Trial‐Related Information: Are They
Competent Defendants?, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 167 (1997).
59
Compare Molly S. Jacobs et al., Competence-Related Abilities and Psychiatric
Symptoms: An Analysis of the Underlying Structure and Correlates of the MacCAT-CA and
the BPRS, 32 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 67 (2008) (showing validation of instrument), with
Nancy R. Panza & Theresa Fraser, Effects of Age, Adaptive Behavior, and Cognitive Abilities
on Competence-Related Abilities in Children and Adolescents, 15 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL.
PRAC. 138 (2015) (showing results contrary to expected clustering of abilities as measured by
instrument).
55
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Appreciation (the ability to appreciate legal consequences).60 Although
several studies have shown little difference in juvenile and adult competency
scores using the MacCAT-CA, some research has found that juveniles
between ten and fifteen years old are often incompetent according to this
measure.61 Children between nine and twelve years old who have been
administered the MacCAT-CA are often significantly more compromised
than older adolescents, although the MacCAT-CA may not be able to
effectively measure the long-term consequences of Understanding and
Appreciation abilities for older juveniles.62 Indeed, older adolescents have
shown they cannot weigh long-term consequences, which is exemplified by
their readiness to accept “bad” plea bargains for the sole purpose of ending a
case.63
Ultimately, research has indicated that juveniles are generally able to
understand the words said in court proceedings, but, across all ages, are often
unable to properly interpret their legal effect; adolescents possess everyday
“competency,” but the inability to be aware of the consequences of decisions
and think long-term are signs that psycho-social development can impair
abilities necessary for full adjudicative competency.64 Accordingly, whether
a juvenile is ruled competent while exhibiting these shortcomings has
immense legal significance and potential repercussions and can lead to
adjudication involving coercion.65 The Dusky standard, as extended to
juvenile proceedings in In re Gault, holds that individuals must be competent
to stand trial in order for the proceedings to be fair.66 Yet the inability to help
oneself or one’s defense lawyer, susceptibility to undue influence by one’s
lawyer, and inability to understand court proceedings handicap the offender

60

Janet I. Warren et al., Correlates of Adjudicative Competence Among Psychiatrically
Impaired Juveniles, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 299, 301 (2003).
61
For studies showing significant differences between juveniles and adults according to
this measure, see Eraka Bath et al., Correlates of Competency to Stand Trial Among Youths
Admitted to a Juvenile Mental Health Court, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 329 (2015);
Darla M.R. Burnett et al., Adjudicative Competency in a Juvenile Population, 31 CRIM. JUST.
& BEHAV. 438 (2004); Allison D. Redlich et al., Pre‐adjudicative and Adjudicative
Competence in Juveniles and Young Adults, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393 (2003). For an example
of a study showing similar competency levels between adults and juveniles, see Jodi L. Viljoen
et al., Adjudicative Competence and Comprehension of Miranda Rights in Adolescent
Defendants: A Comparison of Legal Standards, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1 (2007).
62
Warren et al., supra note 60, at 300–04.
63
Philip C. O’Donnell & Bruce Gross, Developmental Incompetence to Stand Trial in
Juvenile Courts, 57 J. FORENSIC SCI. 989, 990 (2012).
64
See id. at 990–93.
65
Bradley et al., supra note 6, at 2412.
66
See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
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and increase the likelihood of an unfair legal outcome.67 If a juvenile lacks
the ability to satisfy either or both of the Dusky competency standards due to
developmental immaturity, the juvenile’s decisions over the course of the
trial could be detrimental to his future.68 Yet, as discussed above,
competency screening measures and judicial determinations of competency
have not to date actively and effectively taken psycho-social maturity into
account to ensure fair and equitable outcomes for juveniles.69
III. JUVENILE JUDGES AND DETERMINING JUVENILE COMPETENCY
Juvenile judges, using evidence, their own opinions, and competency
evaluations from psychologists or clinicians, are the individuals who make
the ultimate rulings whether or not juveniles are competent to stand trial.70
When looking at competency evaluations, juvenile judges tend to put
significant weight on the opinions of a clinician or psychologist who
conducts a competency evaluation.71 Age sometimes increases a judge’s
likelihood of declaring incompetence, with younger juveniles being more
likely to be ruled incompetent, although results are inconsistent.72 For
example, within a sample of Chicago juvenile offenders, roughly 27% of
incompetent juveniles were less than twelve years old, compared to only 11%
of competent juveniles.73 Similarly, in a study of juvenile offenders in Los
Angeles, juveniles younger than fifteen years old were more likely to be ruled
incompetent than older juveniles.74 Evidence of a mental health issue, such
as a psychiatric diagnosis, has also been known to be influential to juvenile
judges’ competency decisions.75
Yet there is far less evidence about the influence of developmental
maturity on juvenile judges’ competency decisions. A survey of juvenile
judges and defense attorneys from seven states showed roughly 75% of
judges did not believe that a youth’s developmental immaturity significantly
affected competency.76 Conversely, Cox et al., utilizing experimental
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75
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vignettes, found that judges considered juvenile psycho-social maturity to be
significant to judicial determinations of competency for adolescents between
twelve and seventeen years of age.77 Thus, the limited evidence that exists
on how judges prioritize adolescent development in competency decisions
uses quantitative research designs and is conflicting.
Marked changes have occurred in the last twenty years as the justice
system, including the Supreme Court, has used research on adolescent
development in rulings to recognize key differences in psycho-social
development between juveniles and adults.78 However, judges’ attitudes may
affect the ways in which they view and rule upon juvenile competency, which
may correspondingly shape caselaw.79 Juvenile judges have been recognized
as the main individuals who dictate the philosophy of the juvenile justice
system.80 A juvenile judge is responsible for ensuring that the court treats
juveniles fairly and has the means to offer effective services and treatment to
juveniles.81 Therefore, juvenile judges’ appreciation of the role of adolescent
development in making competency determinations is both practically and
philosophically important.
Overall, it remains unclear how adolescent development may fit into
competency determinations for judges.82 There is no national standard for
juvenile competency, nor unanimity about the influence of developmental
immaturity on juvenile competency amongst juvenile judges.83 Utilizing
semi-structured interviews with twenty-seven juvenile judges from across the
U.S. and grounded theory methods, this study examines juvenile judges’
perceptions of the factors that affect juvenile competency to stand trial,
particularly their understandings and perceptions of adolescent development
and psycho-social maturity.84
Specifically, we were interested in
determining if, how, and why judges take psycho-social immaturity into
consideration when making attributions about juveniles’ adjudicative
competency, whether or not judges’ attitudes toward adolescent development
and competency related to one another, if judges had been trained on these
77
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25, 25–29 (1992).
81
See id.
82
See Viljoen & Wingrove, supra note 75, at 220–26.
83
Amanda NeMoyer et al., Attorney Perspectives on Juvenile and Adult Clients’
Competence to Plead Guilty, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 171, 172 (2018); Ryba et al.,
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issues, and if such attitudes might negatively impact the adjudication of cases
in juvenile court.85
IV. MATERIALS AND METHODS
This research uses qualitative methodology, which allows for complex
descriptions, detailed understandings and contextualization of the
experiences being studied, and a grounded theory approach.86 Ultimately,
our data consist of semi-structured interviews with twenty-seven juvenile
court judges from sixteen different states, collected from January 2018 to
March 2018. This study has been approved by the authors’ institutional
review boards (IRBs).
A. PARTICIPANT SELECTION

Purposeful random sampling was used for this research.87 The
purposeful sample for this study is a random selection of judges from across
the U.S. who sit on juvenile courts and hear juvenile delinquency
proceedings. Only juvenile judges whose mailing addresses were publicly
available were accessible for study selection, resulting in targeting only
thirty-nine of the fifty states. Further, no previous time on the bench,
experience with competency, or previous knowledge of adolescent
development, neuroscience, or psychology, was required of judges to
participate in the study.
Purposeful sampling, which allows for the methodical selection of
participants who can provide valuable information relevant to the study’s
focus, is a commonly used theoretical sampling technique that provides cases
to deeply study the research questions and allow for the emergence of
grounded theory.88 While random sampling is often used to provide
representativeness and generalizability to a sample and research questions,89
neither were goals of this research, and this study instead used purposeful
random sampling, rather than purposeful sampling, for two main reasons.
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See infra Section V.
For descriptions of qualitative methodologies, see generally JOSEPH A. MAXWELL,
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First, the intent of this research was not to focus on the views of judges
in one particular state because juvenile competency is a national issue that
affects all juvenile judges in all jurisdictions.90 Therefore, we believed our
research questions were relevant to judges from across the United States, and
a deep, emergent understanding of these issues, which is the goal of grounded
theory research,91 required participants from several states. Since we chose
to sample juvenile judges from the across the United States, purposeful
random sampling was used because it would be impossible to contact every
juvenile judge in the country. There are thousands of judges that review
thousands of cases in juvenile courts across states, meaning that every judge
who fit the selection criteria could not be contacted or interviewed.92
Therefore, as described below, we chose to randomly select counties and
fifteen judges from those counties in order to provide a methodical sampling
technique for each state that would provide a feasible sampling strategy.
Second, although judges’ jurisdictions did not appear to affect their views in
this research, we also wanted to allow for data collection from many
jurisdictions in order to allow for and record those differences in views by
jurisdiction if present.93
The initial goal for the research sample was between twenty and thirty
judges, the model size for grounded theory to reach theoretical saturation.94
The selection of judges for this research occurred in two stages. First,
juvenile judges in the state of Georgia were targeted. These interviews
served as a pilot for the interview protocol, and a random selection of fifteen
judges were sent an interview request via U.S. mail. Juvenile judges in
Georgia were targeted at this stage because Georgia has a Council of Juvenile
Court Judges that makes the mailing addresses of all juvenile judges in the
state available online in one location.95 Once those judges were contacted
and some of them interviewed, the protocol was slightly amended for clarity
(but no changes to content), and the second stage of selection was
undertaken.
90
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Second, a random selection of juvenile judges in thirty-eight other states
were targeted. Eleven states (Delaware, Alaska, Kentucky, Maine,
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Vermont) and the District of Columbia were omitted from the
sampling because there was either no public posting of these states’ juvenile
judges or the mailing addresses of posted judges were not publicly available.
A random sample of seven counties from each of the remaining thirty-eight
states was tabulated; then, a random sample of fifteen juvenile judges from
across those seven counties for each state was collected from online court
websites. Judges were contacted via U.S. mail to request participation. In
total, 570 judges were targeted from these remaining thirty-eight states.
Combined with the fifteen judges targeted from Georgia, this study
targeted 585 judges from thirty-nine states by mail. This number of judges
(585) was targeted in order to obtain a sample of twenty to thirty judges as a
model sample size for this grounded theory study. Previous research
interviewing state court judges has shown that the interview request response
rate for judges is traditionally around 5%,96 meaning that contacting 585
judges was likely necessary to secure the participation of between twenty to
thirty judges. In all, twenty-seven of the 585 judges contacted agreed to
participate, resulting in a 5% response rate.
B. DATA COLLECTION

Sources of data include semi-structured interviews with judges fitting
the selection criteria above. The courthouse mailing addresses of targeted
judges (N=585), which are publicly available online, were collected, and
judges were contacted via U.S. mail with interview requests. Each interview
request included a letter with information on the study and contact
information for the first author, including email address and phone number.
Interviews were scheduled, conducted via telephone, audio-recorded, and
transcribed. Verbal consent from participants was also gathered before
beginning the interviews.
96

For examples of studies with judicial response rates of around 5%, see Colleen M.
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C. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Interviews lasted on average thirty-two minutes and ranged in length
from thirteen minutes to one hour and three minutes.97 They included areas
of questioning, noted below, that allow for the development of grounded
theory.98 There was one interviewer, Dr. Colleen Berryessa, who completed
all twenty-seven interviews. She was trained via cognitive pretesting, which
involves testing the interview instrument with colleagues by asking them to
“think aloud” about each interview question to make sure questions are being
interpreted as intended.99 She was also trained in dialogic engagement,
which involves discussing different points of view on the interview process
and protocol with experts in the current methodology and substantive topics
of study in order to better attune the interview protocol and process to the
research population and study goals.100
Judges were asked several “opinion and values” questions so that they
could describe their thoughts about factors that they may consider in
determining or evaluating juvenile competency, including things most
important in determining adjudicative competency for juveniles, thoughts on
reports and opinions of psychologists in these contexts, and other related
questions. “Knowledge” questions were asked to seek an understanding of
judges’ knowledge of research regarding how juveniles behaviorally,
socially, and emotionally develop during adolescence. “Experience and
behavior” questions were asked to explore past experiences with research
related to adolescent development and training on such issues.
In addition to open-ended prompts, a series of questions from Bradley
et al.101 (some of which are not presented here due to space constraints), were
asked to assess judges’ opinions on the influence of age on competencyrelated abilities, as well as when full brain development occurs; judges were
asked to provide an age or age range as a response to each of these
questions.102 Finally, “background and demographic” questions were asked

97
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to identify and capture judges’ basic demographics that could have
influenced their perceptions as they relate to the current research.
Table 1. Selected questions asked to assess judges’ opinions on the
age of full brain development and the influence of age on
competency-related abilities from Bradley et al.
At what age do you think the human brain fully developed?
At what age is a person old enough . . .
a.

to understand court proceedings and utilize an attorney in his/her own
defense?

b.

to weight long-term consequences of trial such as considering plea
bargains?

c.

to avoid being unduly influenced by authority figures (such as attorneys)?

D. DATA ANALYSIS

A grounded theory approach was used to analyze the data.103 Dedoose
software was used to organize, store, and code the data in a multi-step
process. First, open coding was used, which is the initial process of
iteratively organizing data into preliminary themes observed in the data, after
twelve interviews were conducted.104 Next, following full data collection,
axial coding was used, described by Strauss and Corbin as the process of
“reassembling data that were fractured during open coding.”105 During this
stage, themes established during open coding were grouped into categories
by examining the data to determine how categories are related.106 Finally,
selective coding was used, in which the main theoretical patterns were
developed by comparing and interpreting categories of data to illuminate the
ways in which categories from axial coding are connected, as related to the
study’s research focus.107
Further, interrater reliability of the coding scheme was calculated during
the coding process to validate the coding scheme. Interrater reliability
involves the coding of the data by multiple individuals during data analysis

103
See generally STRAUSS & CORBIN, supra note 86 (reviewing the step-by-step analysis
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and helps to establish the rigor of a qualitative study’s coding scheme.108
Three independent co-coders coded and analyzed a random sample of
nineteen transcripts to calculate the interrater reliability of the coding
scheme. Initial interrater reliability was confirmed (Cohen k=0.72), and
inconsistencies were remedied through discussion between co-coders. Slight
changes were made to data in this piece for readability, but none altered the
essences of the presented quotations.
E. DEMOGRAPHICS

Basic demographics of the twenty-seven interviewed juvenile judges
can be found in Table 2. Although social demographic categories (e.g.,
gender, age, etc.) have been found to potentially influence judges’ views and
philosophies,109 none of the demographics collected in this study, including
the particular states in which judges served, appeared to be connected to or
influence any specific themes observed in the data related to this study’s
research focus. Judges were from sixteen different states. All judges handled
juvenile offenses in delinquency proceedings and held juris doctor degrees.110
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Table 2. Judge Demographics (N=27)
Demographic
Gender
Female
Male

Average Age

States Served (N=16)
Arizona
California
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Indiana
Louisiana
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
Nevada
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Texas
Wisconsin

Value
10 judges
(37.04%)
17 judges
(62.96%)
58.96 years
(SD = 8.37)

1
1
1
1
9
1
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
1
1
1

Average Juvenile
Cases Per Day

22.50 years
(SD = 32.53)

Average Years as a
Judge

12.54 years
(SD = 8.02)

Average Years as a
Juvenile Judge

11.36 years
(SD = 8.32)
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V. RESULTS
Based on the findings, we present five main themes, further divided into
sub-themes, that speak to the nuances of the perceptions of juvenile judges
on adolescent development in relation to their determinations of
competency.111 The first main theme focuses on the perceptions of juvenile
judges on the range and importance of factors that they consider in
determining juvenile competency (A. Factors that Influence the
Determination of Juvenile Competency).112 The second overarching theme
focuses on judges’ understandings of existing research on adolescent
development and how they believe it generally affects juvenile behavior (B.
Perceptions of How Adolescent Development Influences Juvenile
Behavior).113 The third main theme examines if, how, and why judges
consider adolescent development as important in determining juvenile
competency (C. Judges’ Application of Adolescent Development to Juvenile
Competency).114 The fourth general theme discusses a series of questions
judges were asked concerning at what age juveniles develop competencyrelated abilities (D. Opinions on Age of Competency-Related Abilities).115
The final theme examines judges’ previous training on and exposure to
adolescent development research in legal contexts, as well as their levels of
knowledge on and hope for future training on these issues (E. Training on
Adolescent Development and Psycho-social Maturity).116
A. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE DETERMINATION OF
JUVENILE COMPETENCY

1. Age
Judges reported taking age into account when evaluating a juvenile’s
competency, but many did not consider it the most important factor in their
determinations. Emphasis was placed on responding to the juvenile in what
the judges considered to be an age-appropriate manner, particularly if the
juvenile is thirteen years old or younger. Several judges commented that
young children might be unable to meet the standards of competency based
on cognition and context. Judge 7 linked age to immaturity: “There are some
children that may come before the court at very early ages because there are

111
112
113
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See infra Sections V.A.–V.E.
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some acute issue[s] going on, but because of their age, they may well be
deemed not competent to stand trial just because of their age.”117 Further,
most judges believed that the restoration of youth competency (which
includes meetings and exercises with a restoration counselor, as well as
waiting a period of time in order for a youth to become competent enough to
stand trial) for young children was unnecessary and something that judges
sought to avoid. As Judge 2 explained, “If you’re 13 years old and you do
something, why do I want to put you somewhere for a year or two to get you
competent so I can get you back in and then sentence you? That works against
solving the problem.”118
2. Awareness
Judges emphasized awareness as important to their considerations of
juvenile competency. “Awareness” was described as behaviors that
demonstrate to a judge a juvenile’s ability to meet the standards of
competency. As such, awareness was considered necessary by judges
because “if your goal is to punish someone, then you want to be sure they
understand, you know, what it is that is going on and [ . . . ] why they’re being
punished.”119 Judge 22 explained what he looked for when assessing
awareness:
One is, does the child understand who he is working with? As to an attorney and a judge
and so forth. And two, is he able to understand that whatever brought him into court
could lead to consequences for him or her? And if he doesn’t know who he’s working
with or that there are consequences to things happening in court, I guess beyond those
two, we have to take another approach.120

In describing awareness, judges mentioned the importance of certain
features and behaviors of a juvenile such as a juvenile’s demeanor in the
courtroom and during interviews and conversations with judges. Behavioral
cues, judges noted, also bear on juvenile competency, as they are often
indicative of how well a juvenile understands court proceedings and can
assist his defense lawyer. Several judges also mentioned paying attention to
statements made by juveniles about why they had committed criminal acts
and the responses that juveniles give when asked awareness-related questions
by psychologists during competency evaluations. Finally, a juvenile’s
interactions with his attorney were also described to be a key measure of
juvenile “awareness.” Judge 12 gave an example of a tell-tale statement:
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In the courtroom, you’ll see the child say, ‘Well, I know I did this,’ and the attorney
can’t stop them, or ‘I know I’m a bad kid.’ And so, we wind up having statements that
show that they don’t understand their rights or that there’s a process and that process
could be beneficial to the outcome of their situation.121

3. Evidence and History
The “narratives” of juveniles were highlighted as important for judges
in determining competency for the purposes of contextualizing them and
their behavior. Judges acknowledged the possible influences of a juvenile’s
background and experiences with neglect, abuse, and maltreatment that may
affect why a juvenile is in court. For example, one judge stated that she liked
to take background into account “because part of the decision-making for me
is always, where’s that child going to be for the next period of time? And so,
I certainly don’t want to send them to a place that might be detrimental to
their well-being.”122
Judges vocalized an interest in obtaining a “fuller picture” of the
juvenile in competency determinations, including a juvenile’s background,
particularly the psychological and social context in which he is situated.
Judges discussed some of the ways in which they are able to obtain this
“fuller picture,” such as accessing school records and speaking to parents,
case officers, psychologists, and the adolescent’s school to learn about
behavior outside of the courtroom. The importance of understanding this
background was noted by Judge 4, who explained:
You have a better understanding and perspective on how to handle delinquency cases
because a lot of times, you know, children make bad decisions. A lot of times, it’s
because of their environment or the way they were brought up or what’s going on in
the home and a lot of times that can be changed or affected when they’re very young.
But if it’s not caught, then a lot of times these are the same kids that [grow up to] be
what we would call a delinquent.123

4. Mental Capacity
The mental capacity of juveniles came up frequently as important pieces
of evidence in competency determinations. Capacity, in this context, speaks
to the youth’s legal capacity to make particular legal decisions, such as
entering a guilty plea or entering into a contract; such capacity can be affected
by mental disorder, intellectual disability, or other factors.124
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Judges particularly took capacity as it relates to mental health into
consideration, often being “particularly concerned about . . . [the]
competency of children with special needs.”125 Many judges stated that a
juvenile’s mental ability influenced or even often determined whether a judge
would decide to move forward with adjudication; particularly intellectual
disability, meaning an IQ below 70, was seen as compelling evidence to
reject competency. If a child does not have appropriate mental capacity, then
he or she will not be able to understand court proceedings, assist his or her
attorneys, or communicate effectively, all key elements of competency.
Judge 20 gave an example of a previous case in which a defense lawyer did
not believe his older juvenile client was competent, but the juvenile was
discovered to have high-functioning autism during the competency
evaluation. Interestingly, that diagnosis was considered, but ultimately the
child was ruled competent, as the judge believed that the diagnosis did not
affect the child’s intellectual capacity. Judge 20 stated that such a diagnosis
helped both the judge and the lawyer to understand the juvenile’s behavior
and tailor the court proceedings to his social and affective deficits.
5. Evaluations
Information collected and reported by psychologists in evaluations was
reported by many judges to be most important in competency decisions. In
deciding how best to handle the juveniles that come before them, judges
frequently use the reports to get a sense of whether competency may be a
potential issue. Evaluations were also viewed as a means through which
judges could get information while still protecting the child. Judges were
aware of the potential for error and the intimidating effect of trying to
consider competency without the evaluations.
The evidence found within these evaluations was considered essential
for a subset of judges, who acknowledged that they lacked the “expertise and
the knowledge to evaluate a child’s or a person’s ability to understand.”126
Yet, for many, evaluations are only one of many pieces of evidence taken
into account when determining juvenile competency. A few judges asserted
that “no one area is going to be sufficient all unto itself in my opinion.”127
Particularly, trust in the results of an evaluation was important to the weight
a judge would give these evaluations. Judges had different expectations for
the accuracy and contents of these reports, although many repeatedly
mentioned length and amount of detail as greatly important. Some judges
125
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typically receive shorter reports, but most who placed high value on
evaluations expected longer, more in-depth reports. These judges wanted to
see the evaluators describe their methods and provide their sources of
information about the child. Clarity in results was also a common desire of
judges, along with observations, justifications of results, and for some judges,
evaluators’ recommendations for treatment.
Ultimately, the performance of an evaluator is incredibly important to
juvenile judges, and some judges appeared suspicious of the methods used
by evaluators and the results of evaluations in their jurisdictions. As one
judge stated, “Sometimes the evaluation is only as good as those who are
arranging it, providing the information, and their understanding of it.”128
Judges who expressed a high amount of trust in reports stated that they only
trust these reports at the level they do because they are most often being
performed by evaluators with whom they have worked for a significant
period of time. Judge 15 expressed that “there are some clinicians I probably
have a little bit higher level of confidence in than others, partly because of
how much time I’ve spent with them.”129
B. PERCEPTIONS OF HOW ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT
INFLUENCES JUVENILE BEHAVIOR

1. Increased Social Susceptibility
Judges stressed that the continuing psychological and neurological
development of the juvenile brain makes juveniles more susceptible to the
influence of their peers and authority figures compared to adults.
Particularly, judges considered peer pressure to be a partial explanation of
offending behavior. Judges generally regarded many of the juveniles that
come before them not as “criminals,” but young people who have fallen prey
to bad influence and would not have otherwise offended if not for their peers.
Judge 23 offered an example:
This juvenile, by himself alone would never have done this, but this group of kids in
this particular situation, he got caught along, went along with what everyone else was
doing, was part of it and then something horrible happened. So, I think it has a big
effect on how juvenile offenders and how they— why they do the things that they do.
A good example would be . . . kids tearing stuff up, doing things that are just totally
illogical. Usually, many times it’s in a group.130
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The influence of research on the social susceptibility of juveniles
manifested in judges taking a more sympathetic and understanding view of
juveniles and their behavior. Rather than taking a punitive approach, Judge
2 suggested that the more judges understand social susceptibility, “the more
we know that we shouldn’t hold [juveniles] to the same standard, especially
if there’s a group of people.”131
2. Irrational Behavior and Immaturity
Judges also indicated a belief that the rebellious and greater risk-taking
behaviors exhibited by juveniles are the result of adolescent development.
Judges consistently repeated scientific findings showing that juveniles are
more likely to take risks due to lack of impulse control and incomplete frontal
lobe development, which is knowledge they have procured from previous
trainings. They stated that they often assess how the brain could increase
irrationality in adolescent behavior. Judge 6 explained that “there’s no
question to me that juveniles and adolescents, because their brains are not
fully developed at this point, will make rash or irrational acts and actions that
they themselves may not make once they’re 28, 29, 30 and their brains are
more fully developed.”132
Judges also explained how an appreciation of this research has led them
to adapt their methods of handling juveniles in court. Judge 24 explained
that she has worked to simplify the court process for juveniles in her court
because of the recognition that juveniles lack the ability to “reason through
things and understand consequences long-range.”133 Specifically, she talked
about how it influences standards she sets for juveniles that come into her
court regarding probation and how she makes terms less stringent than she
would for adults. Although she talked about adjusting the court process
based on her knowledge of adolescent development, it is worth noting that
she did not mention adjusting her lens regarding competency; she ascribed
competency related to adolescent development as being relevant to or
involved in “the more serious crimes,” while within the juvenile court setting
“we don’t see a lot of competency [issues].”134
Finally, judges largely remained cognizant of the fact that criminal
behavior of juveniles might be especially emotion-driven. One judge
described juveniles as being “more emotionally than pragmatically driven”
and later expressed beliefs that juveniles’ “brain development is going to be
131
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secondary to their emotional response to things, whether it’s other kids
pressuring them, getting upset, reacting, not thinking it through. I just think
it’s so intertwined . . . their brain is not as great a resource as it will be later
on.”135 Instead of veering toward punishment, their enhanced understanding
of juveniles’ developmental immaturity has led these judges to take an
approach that is more focused on helping juveniles. As Judge 25 put it, “We
expect them to do stupid things. It’s how you limit the potential
consequences when you do those stupid things—that’s key.”136
3. Lack of a Developed Value System
Judges frequently referenced the character of juveniles when discussing
the influence of adolescent development on behavior. Character was
described by judges as an individual’s morals, value systems, and how those
morals and value systems influence actions. Juvenile behavior was often
discussed in terms of the societal impact; a juvenile’s immaturity is harmful
not only to them, but their community as well. Juveniles are less able to meet
societal expectations, such as “empathy, the ability to see things from another
person’s perspective or to understand the consequences in terms of how their
conduct affects other people” because of their adolescent development.137
However, judges regarded juveniles’ lack of developed value systems
and poor character not as fixed but merely the result of juveniles’
developmental immaturity. Judge 13 tied together the biological and social
elements of this juvenile character development, saying, “I think of it as
probably more heavily influenced environmentally than biologically, but it’s
all part and parcel of the brain.”138
C. JUDGES’ APPLICATION OF ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT TO
JUVENILE COMPETENCY

1. Judges Who Do Not Consider Adolescent Development Important
to Competency
Surprisingly, despite its influence on their understandings of juvenile
behavior, adolescent development had a mixed influence on judges’
determinations of competency. Although judges universally expressed
beliefs in findings showing the lack of developmental and behavioral
maturity in juveniles, sixteen out of twenty-seven (59.3%) said that
135
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adolescent development and the immaturity gap bears no influence on their
decisions on competency. These judges viewed adolescent brain and psychosocial development as disconnected from competency. For example, Judge
9 explained that “I don’t know that [information on adolescent development]
helps me at all understand juvenile competency. In fact, I truthfully, when it
comes to that research, I don’t think any of the research I would’ve seen
would explain or help me understand juvenile competency any better.”139
Judge 4 had previously spoken about his experiences of learning about
research on adolescent development in prior judicial training and was able to
explain the process of brain maturation over time. Research does play a role
in his consideration of juvenile behavior generally, as he stated, “We have to
consider [research on adolescent development] . . . That’s one reason why
they’re juveniles, because you assume that their brain hasn’t totally
developed and they make rash decisions without thinking sometimes about
different things. So yeah, you have to consider that.” 140 Yet, when asked
about the potential relationship between juvenile competency and adolescent
development, he explained that “competency is different from brain
development. . . . That’s a different issue altogether.”141 While he viewed
brain development as influential to juvenile decision-making in offending,
he did not consider adolescent development as relevant to determinations of
juvenile competency; instead, he viewed impaired decision-making as an
explanation of why a juvenile was in the courtroom in the first place. This
response particularly reflects the sentiments of the other fifteen judges who
said that adolescent development bears no influence in their competency
decisions. Judge 26 similarly felt that:
Brain development in and of itself doesn’t necessarily affect competency. There might
be other things within the section of brain development, if you have intellectual—an
intellectual disability, a brain injury, something like that. But I think that’s a little bit
different than just, kind of, adolescent brain development. That I think, there’s a whole
lot of differences to that kind of adolescent brain development.142

Indeed, although overall judges indicated the importance of a juvenile’s
“awareness,” meaning behavioral cues and a juvenile’s demeanor that
demonstrate to a judge a juvenile’s competency,143 these judges did not
appear to connect how a juvenile’s awareness in competency was relevant to
adolescent development. Instead, judges appeared to believe that adolescent
development was only connected to criminal actions that result in a juvenile’s
139
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presence in court, while competency focuses on awareness as it relates to
mental capacity and understandings of the legal process. For example, Judge
20 explained that competency is about “whether or not right now, they’re
mentally stable enough to communicate with their attorney to proceed the
trial,” while “[adolescent development] research mostly deals—with just
consequences and acting in the moment versus thinking about risk and
actions have consequences and things like that.”144 Similarly, Judge 19,
commenting that competency is a legal but not a psychological concept,
stated that during competency evaluations, “you’re asking a psychologist
to . . . help you make a determination using terminology that doesn’t mean
anything from a psychological perspective.”145
When asked about the possible connection between research and
competency, some judges were surprised at the very idea that there could
even be a tangible connection between the two. Judge 13 expressed that it
was entirely novel to him: “I’ve never thought of that, I’ve generally thought
of them as, well—except for very young children, I tend to think of those as
independent variables.”146 Judge 10 began to see training differently after
being asked about a possible connection between competency and adolescent
development. He believed that more training should be given on competency
within the context of adolescent development because the relationship was
“an area that we all kind of are uncertain about and I never really thought of
it as much—you’re making me think more as to how [competency] relates to
the adolescent brain.”147
2. Judges Who Consider Adolescent Development Important to
Competency
The eleven of the twenty-seven (40.7%) judges who drew a link
between competency and adolescent development view brain development
as having a “domino effect” on a juvenile’s competency-related abilities,
meaning more competency-related abilities are accrued as the brain matures.
These judges believe that juveniles, given their limited maturity, have limited
understanding that should be taken into account in competency. According
to Judge 23:
If their brain function is such that they can’t really control their behavior, at least don’t
have the ability to appreciate what it is they’re doing, who it might affect and the

144
145
146
147

Judge 20.
Judge 19.
Judge 13.
Judge 10.

580

BERRYESSA & REEVES

[Vol. 110

consequences, then I think you have to take that into account when you’re determining
[competency] . . . So, I think it’s all part of a better, or bigger picture.148

Adolescent development even makes some judges question the
competency inquiry itself. Judge 19 emphasized uncertainty “about whether
competency is even an appropriate yardstick to apply in juvenile cases.”149
Overall, there are two main dimensions along which adolescent
development affects these eleven judges’ views on juvenile competency.
First, research on adolescent development has played a notable role in the
way that these judges analyze the behavior of juveniles and understand their
motivations in the court process.150 Judges go into the courtroom setting with
the knowledge and understanding that juveniles have poorer cognitive
function skills, judgment and decision-making capabilities, and behave less
rationally; as they work, judges try to make sense of the world from the
viewpoint of juveniles and the decisions that they are making.151 They then
use this understanding as an explanation of behavior, and this explanation
then plays a role in how the judge will respond to them in competency-related
matters. Judge 7 explained her mental process: “How does a brain affect how
one thinks and how one perceives their world and their environment, and how
they evaluate what other people do, that’s all part of brain function. You put
those kinds of perceptions together and that’s where kids’ behavior comes
from.”152
Second, knowledge on adolescent development has led judges to take
different approaches when interacting with juveniles in the court setting; in
particular, they are more likely to favor using their discretionary powers to
tailor the court process to fit the individual child and account for their
continuing development. If judges are unable to effectively tailor the process
around a juvenile’s deficits related to adolescent development, then
competency is questioned. This might involve cautioning attorneys on the
social susceptibility of a juvenile or repeating consequences of legal
decisions in order for juveniles to understand the full weight of such choices.
As Judge 27 explained, “When the kid first comes into court, you know, we
need to be figuring out how we are adjusting our language, how we’re
adjusting our form, how we’re adjusting our conversation, you know, all of
that we need to do in terms of what the research is saying.”153 Overall,
understandings of adolescent development have changed the ways that these
148
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judges view juvenile behavior and how juveniles might not understand the
legal process. Judge 2, a judge who worked as a juvenile judge for the
entirety of his career, criticized others for not taking information about
adolescent development into account in competency determinations: “I think
the more we know about it, the better decisions we’ll be able to make. . . . I
think that is inherently wrong for the child, it’s inherently wrong for society
when you see how their brains develop.”154
D. OPINIONS ON AGE OF COMPETENCY-RELATED ABILITIES

Judges were asked their opinions regarding the age at which individuals
gain certain features of competency: the ability to understand court
proceedings, the ability to weigh the consequences of trial, and the ability to
not be unduly influenced by authority figures, particularly one’s attorney.
Additionally, judges were asked at what age they thought the brain fully
develops. Every judge who gave a response (twenty-five total) said that the
brain developed at the age of twenty-four years old or later. They relied
heavily on their previous training and exposure to research as an explanation
for their views (“from what I read and heard, the brain development reaches
its sort of physical maturity at about age twenty-four”).155 A gap in
adolescent and brain development between the sexes was believed to play a
role as well, with judges believing that women’s brains mature faster than
men’s, explaining the “bone-headed” behavior seen more often in boys.156
Even though all responding judges believed that brain development
finishes in an individual’s mid-twenties, most judges’ answers were much
lower than that when asked about the age at which a youth acquires different
competency-related abilities. Over half of judges felt that a juvenile’s
understanding court proceedings was not dependent on age alone and instead
was dependent upon the individual child. These judges indicated that they
would not strike down competency automatically based on age, even for very
young children. Their answers tended to reflect their viewing competency
on a case-by-case basis, regardless of age. Ultimately, sixteen judges gave
an answer that fell within the range of adolescence (thirteen to sixteen years
old), with the rest indicating older ages.
Sixteen judges viewed juveniles sixteen years of age and older as able
to weigh the consequences of trial. However, eleven responses were ages
between twelve and fourteen years old. Those who believed that only older
youth, sixteen years of age or older, could handle these consequences
154
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believed that younger children are largely unable to emotionally and
cognitively process what a trial entails. The ability to avoid being unduly
influenced by authority figures, particularly attorneys, was seen to develop
primarily once an individual is past eighteen years of age for about half the
sample. For these judges, this ability develops once an individual is able to
“think for themselves.” However, over half of judges believed that the ability
to resist undue influence from authority figures, like other competencyrelated abilities, should be determined more on a case-by-case basis; these
were the judges who primarily answered below the age of eighteen for this
prompt. For example, Judge 12 felt that “there are some fifteen-year-olds
that are really confident, then there’s thirty-year-olds who can’t stand up for
themselves.”157
Regardless of the age at which they believed the brain fully develops,
judges’ answers and overall views on these questions indicated two
perspectives regarding these competency-related skills. On one side, some
judges seemed to view these competency-related abilities as “building
blocks” that, with additional information, might “check enough boxes” that
a juvenile understands the legal process, the role of his attorney, and other
consequences of trial enough to be determined competent. These judges
tended to view things on a “case-by-case basis.”158 Judge 8 listed “the
learning of mental age” and “social development” as more informative of a
child’s ability to handle trials, more so than age. Judge 4 expressed
confidence that youth can possess these abilities, saying that “you can have
some young kids who know what an attorney is and know how to deal with
the attorney and effectively communicate with an attorney. And then you got
others that cannot. So, I think at a younger age, sometimes that’s possible.”159
Interestingly, the large majority of judges discussing this “building blocks”
model of competency were those that indicated that considering adolescent
development is not important to them in competency determinations.
On the other side, other judges, particularly those who tended to give
higher ages to these questions, saw competency as requiring several different
layers of understanding legal consequences and processes, many of which
they argued are not possible in young kids. Judges, moving away from the
“building blocks” perspective, argued that all features related to competencyrelated abilities need to be present to indicate juvenile competency. Age
played a larger role in their beliefs in competency generally, not on a caseby-case basis. Judge 21 felt that only those older than twenty-one years old
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could understand court proceedings. From his perspective, “If you say the
word ‘fully’ and that’s the problem, because fully, younger people can, you
know, in the system, they can utilize it, but they can’t ‘fully’ understand and
‘fully’ utilize it.”160 The large majority of judges discussing this “holistic”
model of competency were those that indicated that considering adolescent
development is important to them in competency determinations.
E. TRAINING ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOSOCIAL MATURITY

Judges reported that they gained their knowledge about adolescent
development and developmental science from a variety of sources, the most
common being local judicial trainings (seventeen judges or 63%). Trainings
were most often part of national or state conferences. Six judges had attended
seminars held during the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges conference. The amount of time allotted for these trainings is often
sparse; training sessions typically last between forty minutes and two and a
half days. In addition to conferences, many judges had attended seminars,
usually at the county level for judges, attorneys, and other legal actors, held
by mental health professionals on these issues, usually during a lunch in the
courthouse (thirteen judges). Judges had also received literature and
pamphlets on these issues through conferences and seminars, some of which
they refer back to often (thirteen judges). When asked about the content of
trainings, seminars, and other information judges had received on adolescent
development as part of their judgeships, the overwhelming sentiment was
that this information was about adolescent development as it relates to
juvenile offending, not juvenile competency.
A few judges also commented on learning about adolescent
development from personal experience. Six judges considered their having
raised children as beneficial to their understandings of adolescent
development. For example, Judge 8 explained, “Some of my own experience
both as a dad of two kids and going through that, as well as other children
I’ve seen over the years, sort of reinforces what we’ve learned.”161 Judge 25
viewed parenting as helpful in shaping his approach in the courtroom, saying,
“I always felt that experience of putting yourself in the shoes of a parent and
how you deal with this child, when in doubt, I usually go for that.”162 In these
situations, parenting helped judges observe adolescent behavior within an
everyday context; their experiences with children in the courtroom are easier
160
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because of this, as they are familiar with this behavior and able to easily
attribute it to developmental immaturity.
In interviews, judges were asked to rate their knowledge of research on
adolescent development. Judges tended to rate their knowledge in terms of
four categories: (1) a general rating of one’s knowledge, (2) knowledge as
compared to judicial peers, (3) knowledge as compared to the general public,
and (4) knowledge as compared to experts on the topic. In response to the
general rating of one’s knowledge, nineteen judges rated themselves as
higher than six on a general scale from one to ten, showing a tendency to
view themselves as very knowledgeable. When comparing themselves to
other judges, judges rated themselves highly with an average around 8,
suggesting that they may view themselves as more aware of these issues than
their colleagues. In comparisons to the general public, the ratings were also
high, with the lowest score being a seven and the highest a ten. Comparisons
to experts yielded the lowest ratings, with an average of one.
These rankings reflect a pattern throughout the interviews, namely, that
the judges expressed confidence in their knowledge. Judge 19 stated that, “I
would say I am more open to these concepts [than] most judges. . . . People
can know things and they don’t influence how they try to do their work. I’m
very influenced by this information.”163 Judge 25 referred to his faith in this
research as his having “drank the Kool-Aid early on.”164 Despite expressing
confidence in their knowledge, there was overwhelming support for
receiving more information about adolescent development. All except one
judge held a strong belief that they would still benefit from additional
training. They expressed eagerness to be informed of changes in the field
and new research findings. As Judge 4 put it, “That’s why you have
continuing education. Because, you know, at the minimum you need to be
refreshed on it, because you forget, and you need to understand, and you need
to know, and research is always changing.”165 Judges were also specific
about what they desire to learn. They desire more scientific information
about development, as well as guidance on how to treat juveniles effectively
within the juvenile justice framework as related to development. They also
sought help in figuring out how to respond to and resolve cases in ways that
are most beneficial to the juveniles and even how to adjust the juvenile
system and their courtroom in response to this research.
While judges indicated that they valued training for themselves, more
emphasis was placed on ensuring that their colleagues were properly
163
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educated about adolescent development. Judges viewed some of their
colleagues critically and in great need of training on these issues. For
example, Judge 25 described them as “pay[ing] lip service” to the idea of
developmental science,166 while Judge 14 explained how some of the other
judges “believe that we should come down on these kids like a ton of
bricks.”167 Judge 10 explained the resistance in the judicial “field” to this
new information: “It’s science and sometimes judges in the criminal justice
systems come kicking and screaming into accepting what really is acceptable
science.”168 Increased training was seen as a means through which their
colleagues could become oriented towards seeing juveniles as these judges
do.
VI. DISCUSSION
Through these in-depth interviews with a sample of twenty-seven
judges from across the U.S., we uncover a range of explanations regarding if
and how juvenile judges consider adolescent development in determinations
of juvenile competency.169 Although data show that research on and
understandings of adolescent development do play a large role in shaping
judges’ understandings of juvenile behavior, particularly related to emotional
control, irrational behavior, lack of maturity, and social susceptibility,170
most judges only connected these characteristics to the underlying reasons
for offending behavior and not to juvenile competency.171
This research does have a few limitations. First, although twenty-seven
interviewees for a qualitative interview study is large for research on
judges,172 this research still only portrays the views of twenty-seven
individuals.173 Second, our sample was from sixteen different states, yet was
not nationally representative, and for most of the sixteen participating states,
only one judge was interviewed from each state.174 Conversely, juvenile
judges from the state of Georgia were overrepresented in this study.175
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However, as mentioned above, the state in which judges served did not
appear to have any connection with their views (e.g. Georgia judges did not
appear to express any particular opinions more than other judges).176 That
said, our data are not fully nationally representative,177 and we do not know
how the views found in this sample may align with those of other juvenile
judges across the country.
Third, as discussed in other qualitative research on judges, our interview
request may have resulted in a self-selected sample.178 Particularly, these
judges may be individuals more likely to be interested in participating in a
study on competency than other judges. However, taking these limitations
of the sample into account, representativeness is not the goal of qualitative
research, and the data from our diverse range of juvenile judges did reach
theoretical saturation regarding the themes presented above.179 Finally, we
have discussed the views expressed by judges on adolescent development
and juvenile competency,180 but we do not have data on how these views may
actually impact juvenile competency determinations in practice.
With these limitations in mind, this research produced four main
takeaways. First, juvenile judges reported considering the same types of
factors when determining juvenile competency as those discussed in the
existing literature on judicial views of juvenile competency.181 Although
some judges were somewhat suspicious of competency evaluations and many
considered them only one piece of the puzzle, opinions put forth in
competency evaluations by psychologists or clinicians were described by
judges as important to their determinations,182 which is similar to previous
literature.183 A juvenile’s age, although described by many judges as
considered on a case-by-case basis, was also considered impactful.184
Particularly, similar to Cox et al. and Baerger et al., most judges believed that
some very young children likely will not have the awareness to understand
legal proceedings or aid their attorneys and therefore may not possess
competency-related abilities.185 Finally, evidence of a psychiatric diagnosis
176
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or issues with mental capacity has also been known to influence juvenile
judges’ competency determinations.186 Our data corroborated the importance
of mental capacity in judges’ determinations of juvenile competency.187
Second, our research suggests that juvenile judges are very aware of
psychological and neurological research on adolescent development and the
corresponding immaturity gap between adults and juveniles.188 They
repeated commonly accepted research on these issues and even knew the
names of particular brain regions related to adolescent development, such as
the prefrontal cortex and limbic region.189
Judges also appear to be very influenced by their understandings of
adolescent development when thinking about their own responses to juvenile
offending, with the majority believing that it should guide their decisions on
how to address juvenile behavior in court.190 These views appeared to be at
least in some way influenced by judicial trainings or seminars on adolescent
development related to juvenile offending that the large majority of judges in
this sample have previously taken.191 Indeed, judges highlighted that they
had found the information in these previous learning opportunities helpful,
interesting, and imperative in their rulings and in those of their colleagues.192
Overall, judges’ sentiments on adolescent development and its effect on
juvenile behavior, particularly offending, mirror the historical philosophy of
the juvenile justice system: that age and inexperience make juveniles less
culpable for their actions compared to adults and more likely to be
rehabilitated.193
Third, although very aware of research on adolescent development and
cognizant of the effects it may have on juvenile behaviors related to
emotionality, social susceptibility, risks, and judgment,194 juvenile judges
were divided on whether adolescent development is important (or
unimportant) to determining juvenile competency, with the majority
conveying that they saw no real relationship between the two and do not
consider it.195 This division supports the limited quantitative research that
shows conflicting results on whether judges believe adolescent development
186
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and psycho-social maturity is significant to consider in juvenile competency
considerations, 196 and this research provides much needed qualitative data
that suggests many judges see these concepts as separate, unrelated issues.
Those judges who do consider adolescent development important to
competency determinations recognize that juveniles have poorer cognitive
function skills, behave less rationally, and should be treated differently than
adults during court proceedings.197 Particularly, these psycho-social deficits
signal to judges to take different approaches when interacting with juveniles
in the court setting, using their discretionary powers with caution and
working to tailor the court process to the developmental status of the juvenile
in order to make sure they are understanding the legal process.198
On the other hand, it was surprising that sixteen judges saw no
connection between adolescent development and juvenile competency,199 as
the literature provides evidence that the same behaviors and tendencies
associated with the juvenile immaturity gap also have implications for
juvenile competency.200 Particularly, juvenile judges recognized how
psycho-social deficits associated with adolescent development can affect a
juvenile’s judgment and decision-making,201 which are known to
significantly influence competency-related abilities, such as a juvenile’s
ability to understand future consequences and the weight of his decisions in
court.202 Yet most did not recognize these deficits as potentially causing
problems for juvenile competency.203 Judges identified key differences
between juveniles and adults in their cognitive abilities,204 but these judges
generally did not recognize how these differences could affect behaviors
related to trial, such as understanding and processing legal proceedings.205
Additionally, although acknowledging that juveniles are significantly more
socially susceptible than adults,206 the majority of participants did not discuss
or understand how this susceptibility to peer or authority pressure might
cause a juvenile to be unduly influenced by others, such as his lawyer and
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the judge.207 Judges also accepted the immaturity gap between juveniles and
adults208 but did not recognize how this immaturity may impair competencyrelated abilities, such as understanding what it means to waive legal rights,
take pleas, or the meaning of legal jargon, legal process, and the charges
mounted against them.209
Further, the dissimilar ways in which judges understood age as related
to competency and adolescent development were particularly interesting and
illuminating.210 Literature indicates that both younger and older adolescents
have a demonstrated lack of knowledge regarding trials and legal concepts,
as well as the inability to weigh long-term consequences.211 Yet many judges
felt that a juvenile’s competency is not necessarily dependent on age or
developmental status but should be determined on a case-by-case basis.212
These judges said they would not find a juvenile incompetent automatically
based on age or any one factor, even for very young children.213
Indeed, although indicating that brain development does not stop until
the mid-twenties, the large majority of judges that indicated that adolescent
development is not important to them in competency determinations appear
to view individual competency-related abilities, such as the ability to
understand court proceedings, weigh the consequences of trial, and not be
unduly influenced by authority figures, as “building blocks” that might build
a case for the judge that a juvenile is competent to stand trial, regardless of
age.214
The ways in which these judges discussed competency allude to the
“competency screening” measures that gauge juveniles’ abilities to
“understand,” “reason,” and “appreciate” in different categories and ways in
order to determine whether a juvenile is competent, regardless of age.215
However, the MacCAT-CA, which uses these three subcategories to measure
the cognitive aspects of competency, has been found to be inconsistent in its
ability to effectively measure competency across all ages.216 This may
207
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suggest that this “building blocks” model may not be an effective method in
determining competency, as just “checking boxes” to build a case for
competency can leave out other important competency-related abilities and
indicators, such as age and developmental status, that are not measured by
this method.
Fourth, the fact that many judges do not consider adolescent
development as relevant to competency determinations,217 yet still indicate
that adolescents exhibit attributes due to adolescent development that
diminish competency-related abilities,218 appears to show a cognitive
disconnect. We argue that a likely reason that this disconnect exists for over
half the judges in this study might be because judges have not yet been taught
to think about competency as a psychologically- or developmentally-related
concept, and instead, have been only taught to think of offending as a concept
related to these issues. To highlight, several judges stated that “competency
is different from brain development”219 and “brain development in and of
itself doesn’t necessarily affect competency.”220
“You’re asking a
psychologist to . . . help you make a determination using terminology that
doesn’t mean anything from a psychological perspective,”221 said one judge.
For these judges, competency is about “whether or not right now, they’re
mentally stable enough to communicate with their attorney to proceed to
trial,” while “[adolescent development] research mostly deals . . . with just
consequences and acting in the moment versus thinking about risk and
actions have consequences . . . .”222
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Our results suggest that many judicial determinations of competency do
not actively and effectively take psycho-social maturity into account,223
which may result in unfair and inequitable outcomes for juveniles.224
Particularly, the ways in which many juvenile judges currently think about
competency as a sort of “building blocks” process in which age and
developmental status may not play a key or vital role could lead some
juveniles who lack key competency-related abilities to be found
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competent.225 In order for juveniles to be adjudicated in a “developmentally
appropriate way,”226 judges must be educated on the potential downfalls of
using the “building blocks” model of juvenile competency and the role of
adolescent development in shaping competency-related abilities.
The data provided in this study may help to design more tailored and
effective educational programs for judges on these issues.227 Judges appear
to heavily rely on trainings for making explicit connections between research
and how to deal with juveniles in court.228 Unless the training makes those
direct connections, many judges appear not to be able to abstractly apply the
general principles and findings related to adolescent development to other
areas of juvenile justice, including competency, that are not related to
offending.229 Nonetheless, even in discussing these issues with judges who
do not currently consider adolescent development as important to their
competency determinations, many began to see these issues differently after
being asked about a possible connection—“you’re making me think more as
to how it [competency] relates to the adolescent brain,”230 as one judge stated.
Thus, these results indicate that by making stronger and obvious ties to
competency in trainings, seminars, and other judicial education materials, it
is very possible that more direct education and training of judges on the role
of adolescent development in competency-related abilities may be helpful.
Judges largely appear to be supportive of a return to the rehabilitative
goals of the juvenile justice system, and treating juveniles fairly and
providing effective services to them is a responsibility that falls within the
domain of the juvenile judge.231 By providing direct education to judges on
these issues, we can potentially adjust training to help judges appreciate how
understanding competency in these ways can help maximize rehabilitative,
effective, and equitable outcomes for juvenile offenders.232 As juvenile
judges have been thought to have the most impact on setting the tone and
philosophy of the juvenile justice system,233 we must shape their minds on
these issues before seeing more systemic effects in the juvenile justice
system.
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Further, this research can help to revise existing competency measures,
such as the MacCAT-CA, and assist states that are considering developing or
modifying juvenile competency statutes.234 The Dusky standard is thought to
be an incomplete model of competency for juveniles, particularly leaving out
the potential consideration of developmental immaturity or even age.235 The
few states that have added statutory additions to competency standards
related to adolescent development have given juvenile judges no real
guidelines on how to consider developmental factors in competency
determinations.236 This study’s findings can help identify blind spots of
judges on these issues and craft statutory guidelines on how judges should
analyze and consider developmental factors. In recognition of the limitations
and pitfalls of thinking about juvenile competency from a “building blocks”
perspective, competency screening measures can also be amended, taking
judicial behavior and certain developmental factors into account based on
this data.
Ultimately, this study highlights many areas for future research.
Research designs that involve experimental components, in addition to
qualitative ones, may be able to provide methodological triangulation on
these issues, as well as provide important information on how judges’ views
expressed here may practically affect judges’ decision-making processes in
juvenile competency determinations. Further, future research should directly
examine the influence of judicial training and different levels of judges’
knowledge on adolescent development in relation to their views on
competency and competency-related abilities. As this sample included
judges who described themselves as knowledgeable on these issues,237 it
would be interesting to discuss these issues with judges who have not had
training or exposure to information on adolescent development. As an
experiment, it might be interesting to do a survey or interview on these issues
before and after the training of judges who have recently rotated into juvenile
court for the first time in states that have rotating judicial assignments.
Finally, as this research discusses the role and importance of competency
evaluations by clinicians and psychologists, future inquiries may aim to
survey those individuals on how they would want judges to incorporate the
information they provide into juvenile competency determinations and in
what ways they think adolescent development affects competency-related
abilities.
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